ATLAS OF LANGUAGE

AT-NAV-G01-015 · ATLAS 259

The is–ought gap

The is–ought problem concerns the move from descriptions of what is the case to claims about what ought to be done.

Part of the subject path Argumentation, Logic and Discourse

Why is this entry in the Atlas?

A · Analytical concept R1 · Distinct contribution to understanding

The is–ought gap makes the missing normative bridge between description and prescription examinable. It tests inferential conditions rather than declaring every normative judgment unjustifiable.

Colours and admission grounds

The rectangular label identifies the entry function: F – linguistic figure or procedure; A – analytical concept; G – foundational concept; E – selected concrete case. The rounded badge indicates the admission ground: R1 – distinctive contribution; R2 – necessary foundation; R3 – justified illustrative case. This editorial rationale explains the current selection rather than claiming an undocumented original selection history.

Explanation

The is–ought problem concerns the move from descriptions of what is the case to claims about what ought to be done. A normative conclusion needs an identifiable basis; detailed or striking factual reports do not supply it by themselves. Argument analysis therefore first makes an often unstated bridging assumption explicit and subjects it to scrutiny. Interpretations of Hume's passage remain contested. His problem must not simply be identified with Moore's criticism of defining goodness through other properties.

Movement of thought

1. Separate factual statements from evaluations. 2. Identify the conclusion's normative content. 3. Formulate the bridging assumption needed for the transition. 4. Assess that norm on its own grounds. 5. Reconnect factual knowledge and normative judgement explicitly.

Scientific use case

Ethics and discourse analysis can reconstruct normative bridges and show where descriptions are presented as automatically imposing duties.

Example

“Most people use the park, so everyone must use it” requires an additional norm about majority practice, which is itself open to challenge.

Counterexample

“We ought to follow agreed rules; this rule was agreed; therefore we ought to follow it” already includes a normative premise. It is not a derivation from facts alone.

Distinction

Distinguish Moore's narrower naturalistic fallacy, moral disagreement and factual error. This profile does not suggest that facts are irrelevant to ethical judgement.

Effect on thought and perception

Habit and frequency lose their appearance of being binding in themselves.

Resonance

A space for giving reasons opens between what exists and what is demanded.

Provenance

Parallel source review reconciled 2026-10-07; human specialist review not claimed.

Cite this entry

Reich, Michael (Hrsg./ed.): „The is–ought gap“. Atlas der Sprache, AT-NAV-G01-015. ATLAS 259, data model 1.6.0. https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-NAV-G01-015

https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-NAV-G01-015

The address remains stable; editorial content may evolve. Editorial reading state: 2026-10-15. Include your access date for precise references.