ATLAS OF LANGUAGE

AT-NAV-G05-040 · ATLAS 259

Truth

In epistemology, truth concerns when what a truth-evaluable claim states is the case.

Part of the subject path Philosophy of Language, Thought and Knowledge

Why is this entry in the Atlas?

G · Foundational concept R2 · Necessary foundation

Truth distinguishes a statement’s being the case from persuasion, confidence and agreement. It provides a basis for detecting the substitution of communicative success for factual accuracy.

Colours and admission grounds

The rectangular label identifies the entry function: F – linguistic figure or procedure; A – analytical concept; G – foundational concept; E – selected concrete case. The rounded badge indicates the admission ground: R1 – distinctive contribution; R2 – necessary foundation; R3 – justified illustrative case. This editorial rationale explains the current selection rather than claiming an undocumented original selection history.

Explanation

In epistemology, truth concerns when what a truth-evaluable claim states is the case. Philosophical theories explain this differently, for example through correspondence, coherence or the role of the truth predicate. This entry does not settle that debate with a single intuitive formula. Its initial analytical purpose is to distinguish truth from justification, certainty and agreement. A well-justified claim can turn out false; a lucky correct guess can be true without amounting to knowledge. Which expressions count as truth-evaluable also depends on the account being used.

Movement of thought

1. Specify the claim. 2. Identify its truth commitment. 3. Record reasons separately. 4. Test possible counterevidence. 5. State theoretical assumptions.

Scientific use case

Epistemology can distinguish truth systematically from epistemic justification.

Example

A stopped clock happens to show the correct time; that correct display alone does not make it a reliable source of knowledge.

Counterexample

General agreement does not establish a claim's truth without further argument or theoretical commitments.

Distinction

Distinguish truth from certainty, consensus, usefulness and justification.

Effect on thought and perception

The concept prevents persuasiveness from silently merging with truth.

Resonance

Being certain and being right are different relations to the world.

Provenance

Parallel corpus 98f0950771ae4662f291d2f15f5c51b6797f3c20ba458a68615cdb177002ea18; case-bounded source review accepted; human specialist review not claimed.

Cite this entry

Reich, Michael (Hrsg./ed.): „Truth“. Atlas der Sprache, AT-NAV-G05-040. ATLAS 259, data model 1.6.0. https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-NAV-G05-040

https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-NAV-G05-040

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