Explanation
A prediction about attendance and a commitment to return books may refer to the same day but do different things. The commitment allows someone else to organise their own conduct around the speaker's undertaking. That relation begins before the future act is performed. An insincere promise can still establish an undertaking and abuse trust; it is not necessarily an absence of any act. Unexpected prevention is another case. Later inability does not retroactively erase the earlier event, but may change what explanation, release or substitute action can responsibly be sought. No single formula settles every moral question.
Movement of thought
1. Examine wording, addressee and situation. 2. Separate prediction, intention and undertaken commitment. 3. Clarify content, conditions and available agency. 4. Follow the addressee's uptake and resulting expectations. 5. Evaluate sincerity and later fulfilment separately.
Scientific use case
Speech-act theory examines conditions of undertaking and sincerity; interaction analysis can examine recognisable uptake. Neither establishes a complete moral or legal theory by itself.
Example
Invented contrast: 'I will probably be in the library tomorrow' predicts attendance. 'I promise to return your books at ten' offers a basis for planning. A speaker who never intended to return them and one unexpectedly prevented later face different questions, even if both fail to arrive.
Counterexample
Saying I promise in quotation, theatre, obvious irony or coercion does not automatically establish the same commitment. Not every assurance creates identical moral or legal rights. The profile supplies no present contract or liability advice.
Distinction
Prediction and intention need not undertake an obligation to another. Threats may also create future expectations but with different relations. Social expectation, moral binding and legal enforceability remain separate.
Effect on thought and perception
Language appears as a means of assuming responsibility for a future, not only depicting one.
Resonance
A dependable word can support shared plans. The same relation makes betrayal, disappointment and negotiation of release possible.
Etymology
The German word has several uses. Reflexive sich versprechen as a speech error belongs to another lexical use and profile.
Provenance
The HWdR dossier discusses competing philosophical and speech-act accounts. Theory-specific requirements about benefit or expected action are not turned into universal linguistic laws.
Cite this entry
Reich, Michael (Hrsg./ed.): „Promise“. Atlas der Sprache, AT-ADD-20261020-0042. ATLAS 261, data model 1.6.0. https://atlasoflanguage.com/concept/AT-ADD-20261020-0042The address remains stable; editorial content may evolve. Editorial reading state: 2026-10-20. Include your access date for precise references.
Guiding question
When am I predicting a future, and when am I making myself answerable for it?
Five coordinate questions
These descriptions explain the entry. They are not controlled register values and do not generate shared register results.
- Where can the process be observed?
Invented contrast: 'I will probably be in the library tomorrow' predicts attendance. 'I promise to return your books at ten' offers a basis for planning. A speaker who never intended to return them and one unexpectedly prevented later face different questions, even if both fail to arrive.
- What happens to the material?
Examine wording, addressee and situation.
Separate prediction, intention and undertaken commitment.
Clarify content, conditions and available agency.
Follow the addressee's uptake and resulting expectations.
Evaluate sincerity and later fulfilment separately.
- At what level does a change occur?
Language appears as a means of assuming responsibility for a future, not only depicting one.
- What temporal structure is explicitly described?
The steps offer an order of analysis, not an asserted real-time sequence of mental events. Read the particular example sequence separately from the historical development.
- How can the description be tested?
Saying I promise in quotation, theatre, obvious irony or coercion does not automatically establish the same commitment. Not every assurance creates identical moral or legal rights. The profile supplies no present contract or liability advice.
Historical context
The HWdR dossier discusses competing philosophical and speech-act accounts. Theory-specific requirements about benefit or expected action are not turned into universal linguistic laws.
Cross-language distinction and terminology
Promise is the lead equivalent. Assurance and undertaking can fit particular contexts, but none automatically decides the kind or enforceability of the obligation.
Scholarly comparisons and distinctions
These entries are editorial comparison anchors for the distinctions made in this article. They are not new canonical relation edges or shared register results.
Proposed thought pathway
- Examine wording, addressee and situation.
- Separate prediction, intention and undertaken commitment.
- Clarify content, conditions and available agency.
- Follow the addressee's uptake and resulting expectations.
- Evaluate sincerity and later fulfilment separately.
An editorial exploration, not a necessary sequence of thought or experimental evidence of an effect.
Source scope and provenance
Both specialist versions are editorially accepted. The recorded scope of the reference-work research is retained; this is not a fresh full verification of every primary source. Examples and analytical steps are Atlas applications.